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OVERREGULATION OF HEALTH CARE: 
MUSINGS ON DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 
THEORY 
LESLEY H. CURTIS, PH.D.,* AND KEVIN A. SCHULMAN, M.D.** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Health care costs in the United States are rising at an extraordinary rate.1  
The escalation has been attributed to a variety of factors, including the 
managed-care backlash,2 consumer choice,3 consumerism in an aging society,4 
and insufficient competition in the health care industry.5  In addition, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that regulatory control may be a significant driver of health 
care costs.6  In this paper, we hope to expand on the discussion of 
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 1. See Sarah Lueck, Health-Care Spending Rises 8.7%, Fastest Expansion in 10 Years, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 8, 2003, at D2; Robert Pear, Spending on Health Care Increased Sharply in 2001, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 2003, at A12. 
 2. See James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2622–28 (2001) (detailing 
the departure from an economically successful but politically unpopular model of managed care); Carol 
Gentry, UnitedHealth Move on Reviews is Seen as Industry Watershed, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1999, at 
B6; Jonathan Oberlander, The U.S. Health Care System: On a Road to Nowhere?, 167 CAN. MED. 
ASS'N J. 163, 166–68 (2002). 
 3. See Robinson, supra note 2. 
 4. See Marilyn Moon, Medicare, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 928, 928 (2001) (detailing the growth in 
life expectancy, especially among those who have already reached a mature age). 
 5. See Thomas Bodenheimer, High and Rising Health Care Costs, Part 1: Seeking an Explanation, 
142 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 847, 850 (2005). 
 6. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE FACTORS FUELING RISING HEALTHCARE COSTS 3 
(2002), available at http://www.aahp.org/InternalLinks/PwCFinalReport.pdf (claiming that fifteen 
percent of the total increase in health care premiums is a result of government mandates and 
regulation); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION: VARYING STATE 
REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF INSURANCE 2 (1996) (concluding that state health insurance 
regulations add costs to insured health plans); See also SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON 
REGULATORY REFORM, BRINGING COMMON SENSE TO HEALTH CARE REGULATIONS 10 (2002), 
available at http://www.rwhc.com/papers/DHHS.RRAC.11.21.02.Report.pdf. 
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“overregulation” by Havighurst and Richman7 by considering in particular some 
of the effects that regulatory controls may have on innovation in the health 
sector. 
For the purpose of this discussion, we adopt a definition of regulatory 
controls (“regulations”) offered by Berenson8 and extend it to private and 
public entities performing the same function.  Regulatory-control activities 
involve applying external rules in a consistent, uniform, and mechanistic way to 
patients and providers.  For example, strictly enforcing a defined benefit 
package and paying physicians according to a fixed-fee schedule are regulatory 
tools.9  Regulations, whether aimed at improving quality or controlling prices, 
may exert upward pressure on costs in a variety of ways.10  First, documentation 
of compliance with regulations often requires substantial paperwork.  A recent 
survey by the American Medical Association suggests that physicians may 
spend one hour completing Medicare paperwork for every four hours of patient 
care.11  Second, regulations in one area may conflict with regulatory 
requirements in another, resulting in confusion and duplication of effort.12  For 
example, a Medicare beneficiary may have the same information collected by as 
many as five care providers (for example, hospitals, physicians, home health, 
nursing home, and durable medical equipment).  Third, directives that 
micromanage processes of care become obsolete as health care technology and 
the health care delivery system evolve.  According to one estimate, more than 
132,000 pages of governmental rules, requirements, guidelines, and directives 
currently govern the delivery of health care.13 
In addition, regulations may profoundly affect costs by stifling innovation in 
service delivery and quality improvement.14  Rules designed to protect 
consumers may have the unintended consequence of preventing good-quality, 
lower-cost alternatives from reaching the marketplace.  In this article, we draw 
on the theory of disruptive innovation to explore this unintended consequence 
of regulation—specifically, how regulation of the primary-care delivery system 
may increase costs without providing improvements in quality.  First, we 
present the theory of disruptive innovation and apply it to the heavily regulated 
health care market.  Second, we discuss disruptive innovation in the primary-
 
 7. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 50–71  (Autumn 2006). 
 8. Robert A. Berenson, A Physician’s View of Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1991, at 106, 
110. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Christopher J. Conover, Health Care Regulation: A $169 Billion Hidden Tax, 527 POL'Y 
ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2004). 
 11. Medicare Reform: Bringing Regulatory Relief to Beneficiaries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 12 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement 
of Richard F. Corlin, President-elect, American Medical Association). 
 12. See SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM., supra note 6, at 13. 
 13. Hearings, supra note 11, at 134–35 (letter and attachment of Bruce M. Kelly, director of 
government relations, Mayo Foundation). 
 14. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM., supra note 6, at 48. 
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care delivery system, using diabetes care as an example.  Finally, we discuss the 
challenges of making the regulatory environment more hospitable to innovation 
in a way that improves the quality and reduces the costs of health care. 
II 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION THEORY 
Disruptive innovation—proposed by Christensen15 and further explicated in 
an important paper by Macher and Richman16—attempts to explain why some 
companies fail to stay atop their industries when faced with certain types of 
market and technological change.  The theory assumes that consumer 
preferences for individual technologies are widely distributed.17  Early 
innovators enter markets with basic products that meet the needs of a segment 
of the market.18  Over time, innovators improve the product’s capabilities 
(“sustaining innovation”) to meet the demands of high-end consumers who 
offer potentially higher margins and more profitable markets.19  Business 
models (and products within an individual firm) typically evolve by continuing 
to meet the needs of those customers through high-end innovation.  The 
resulting higher-quality products serve the needs of the most lucrative segments 
of the market.20 
Christensen argues, however, that “sustaining innovation” leads firms to 
develop products that possess capabilities far beyond what the average 
consumer desires or can absorb (Figure 1).21  The overdeveloped product 
creates an opportunity for a new product, process, or business model—one 
initially offering the most basic features—to enter the market.  “Disruptive 
innovation” occurs when this new product, entering the market at a lower level 
of sophistication, rapidly progresses to meet the needs of the majority of 
consumers in the marketplace and, as a result, captures market share from well-
established firms.22 
III 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR 
Does the theory of disruptive innovation apply to a highly regulated market 
like health care?  A key tenet of Christensen’s theory is that a firm introduces 
into the market a new business model offering products with basic features, thus 
securing a substantial portion of the consumer base, and then enhances the 
 
 15. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA (1997). 
 16. Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Organisational Responses to Discontinuous 
Innovation: A Case Study Approach, 8 INT’L J. INNOVATION MGMT. 87 (2004). 
 17. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 15, at xv–xxiv. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at xvi. 
 22. See id. at xv. 
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product over time.23  The presence of regulation, however, may effectively 
prevent disruptive technological improvements from occurring.  In a lightly 
 
Figure 1. Sustaining Innovation and Disruptive Innovation 
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regulated market, disruptive innovation may emerge because the low threshold 
of mandated requirements allows the introduction of products having only basic 
features.  (See Figure 2).  In a heavily regulated market, however, the 
performance threshold is higher: all products must meet mandated 
requirements B to enter the market.  Central to the theory of disruptive 
innovation is that disruptions occur in response to a performance oversupply.24  
The performance of the mainstream product exceeds the performance 
requirements of the average consumer.25  To the extent that the requirements 
established by regulations exceed the requirements of the average consumer, 
disruptive innovation cannot occur. 
 
Figure 2. Sustaining Innovation and Disruptive Innovation in Markets of  
 Light and Heavy Regulation 
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In addition to the barriers to entry imposed directly by regulation, more 
subtle incidental barriers may also exist.  Protected by regulation, health care 
organizations may use monopoly rents to prevent new business models from 
entering the market.  In addition, disruptive innovators have limited access to 
the regulatory process.  A two-person start-up is unlikely to have ready access 
to congressional committees or to the senior leadership of a regulatory body.  
Thus, rather than consider proposals for new business models that operate at 
the margins of existing regulations, Congress, regulatory bodies, and industry 
concentrate their efforts on advancing incremental changes in the status quo.  
Furthermore, regulatory bodies typically deal with a narrowly defined question.  
The overall effect of a particular decision on the evolution of the marketplace is 
not considered.  Finally, the net impact of the rules on efficiency and quality in 
the marketplace is not evaluated. 
Are there examples of disruptive innovation in health care?  In its purest 
form, capitation26 has the hallmarks of a disruptive innovation.27  Capitation  
aims to provide basic, integrated care to less-demanding customers (that is, 
healthier patients) at a lower cost.28  In theory, capitation disrupts the 
relationship between the patient and a highly specialized, fragmented system by 
offering a single point of contact at a lower price.29  As a business model, 
capitation is distinct from traditional fee-for-service medicine in that it permits 
the transfer of resources among providers so that the cost of service 
improvements (for example, home care for asthma) can be offset by gains in 
efficiency (for example, fewer hospitalizations and emergency department 
visits).30 
As implemented through managed-care programs, however, capitation has 
failed to achieve the gains associated with disruptive innovation.  Although 
managed care appeared initially to control health care expenses, costs are again 
on the rise.31  Compliance with evidence-based guidelines32 is comparable in 
 
 26. Here, “capitation” refers to a specific payment mechanism by which a provider is paid a fixed 
amount, determined in advance, for the care of an individual or group for a prespecified period of time, 
regardless of the type or number of services actually provided.  By contrast, “managed care” refers to a 
type of organizational framework for the provision of health insurance, in which capitation is one 
commonly used mechanism for controlling health care costs. 
 27. Clayton M. Christensen, Richard Bohmer & John Kenagy, Will Disruptive Innovations Cure 
Health Care?, HARV. BUS. REV., Sep.–Oct., 2000, at 102. 
 28. See id. at 104. 
 29. See id. at 104–05. 
 30. See Donald M. Berwick, Part 5: Payment by Capitation and the Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1227, 1228–30 (1996). 
 31. See Oberlander, supra note 2; Bradley C. Strunk, Paul B. Ginsburg & Jon R. Gabel, Tracking 
Health Care Costs,  2001 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W39, W39; Christopher Hogan, Paul B. 
Ginsburg & Jon R. Gabel, Tracking Health Care Costs: Inflation Returns, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 
2000, at 217, 217. 
 32. Evidence-based guidelines are systematically developed statements that define standards of 
care based on sound scientific research.  See Patrick J. O’Connor, Adding Value to Evidence-Based 
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managed-care and non-managed-care settings.33  Consumer satisfaction is 
consistently lower in managed-care settings, as compared to non-managed-care 
settings.34  In sum, few would argue that managed care satisfies the needs of the 
majority of consumers in the marketplace by offering a product of markedly 
higher quality at a lower cost. 
Christensen argues that disruptive innovation has occurred in selected 
pockets of health care, citing home-based blood-glucose self-monitoring for 
patients with diabetes, coronary angioplasty for the treatment of coronary-
artery disease, and the emergence of nurse practitioners as examples.35  In these 
cases, Christensen asserts, the innovation allowed tasks that historically could 
be performed only by specialists in centralized locations to be performed by a 
larger, less-skilled group in a more convenient, less-expensive setting.36  
Moreover, by enabling less-costly providers (even patients themselves) to 
address specific health care needs, these innovations increased efficiency and 
access without compromising quality.37 
Why has managed care failed as a disruptive innovation while home glucose 
monitoring, coronary angioplasty, and the nurse-practitioner model have 
succeeded?  One might argue that none of these “successful” innovations is 
truly disruptive at the market level.  None has fundamentally changed the 
system of primary care or fostered the development of new and innovative 
models of health care delivery.  Instead, technology has added to the existing 
system, resulting in increased costs with uncertain consequences for quality.38  
Physicians supervise nurse practitioners and, in most markets, payment 
regulations restrict nurse practitioners to a primary-care role.39  Although 
patients monitor their blood glucose, there is no real-time interface with the 
physician to integrate the resulting data into treatment strategies.  Finally, 
angioplasty relies on the same hospital-based business model as does cardiac 
surgery; the procedure is simply performed by a cardiologist rather than a 
cardiac surgeon. 
An alternative argument is that disruptive innovations that succeed in health 
care do so because they face fewer regulatory barriers.  To some degree, 
 
Clinical Guidelines, 294 JAMA 741, 741–43 (2006) (describing evidence-based clinical practice 
guidelines and their role in quality-improvement initiatives). 
 33. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, HMO Plan Performance Update: An Analysis of the 
Literature, 1997–2001, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2002, at 63 [hereinafter HMO Performance]; Robert 
H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of Care?, HEALTH 
AFF., Sep.–Oct. 1997, at 7. 
 34. HMO Performance, supra note 33, at 63. 
 35. See Christensen, supra note 27, at 106–08. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See John M. Eisenberg et al., Subtituting Diagnostic Services: New Tests Only Partly Replace 
Older Ones, 262 JAMA 1196, 1196 (1989) (concluding that new systems take place alongside, rather 
than replace, older ones). 
 39. See Richard A. Cooper, Tim Henderson & Craig L. Dietrich, Roles of Nonphysician Clinicians 
as Autonomous Providers of Patient Care, 280 JAMA 795 (1998). 
09__CURTIS_SCHULMAN.DOC 3/7/2007  3:58 PM 
202 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 69:195 
regulation may initially have protected the managed-care market.  By 
exempting self-insured, employer-sponsored benefit plans from state regulation, 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197440 effectively created a 
favorable climate for the expansion of managed-care programs.41  Rather than 
evolve as a distinct business model, however, managed care developed as an 
extension of existing insurance networks and their nonexclusive relationships 
with multiple providers.  The corporate practice of medicine and restrictive 
state laws precluded the evolution of truly new models of service delivery in 
many states.42  As managed care grew rapidly throughout the 1990s, however, 
criticisms of managed care led to the introduction of more than a thousand 
pieces of legislation at the federal and state levels addressing consumer 
protection in managed-care settings.43  From January to July 1996 alone, state 
legislatures introduced more than 400 bills to regulate managed-care 
programs.44  Over time, then, managed care has come to look less like a new and 
distinct business model, and more like a close cousin of the indemnity insurance 
model that spawned the innovation. 
IV 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION IN THE DELIVERY OF PRIMARY CARE 
The delivery of primary care has changed fundamentally over the past three 
decades.  Throughout the 1970s, most patients experienced primary care in the 
form of “Marcus Welby medicine.”  The patient visited the primary care 
physician’s private office for medical care or, if the patient was too ill, the 
physician visited the patient at home.  The physician spent as much time as 
necessary to make the initial diagnosis and then coordinated the care of chronic 
conditions.  Over time, the practice of medicine became increasingly 
specialized, and the use of high-end technology flourished.  Although 
specialization and new technologies served the needs of a profitable sector of 
the market, the fragmentation of service delivery made health care less 
convenient for patients with basic needs.  In the lexicon of disruptive innovation 
theory, increasing specialization and reliance on technology represent 
sustaining innovations—changes that move primary care further along the same 
performance trajectory at progressively higher cost. 
How might disruptive innovation transform the delivery of primary care?  
The example of diabetes care describes a hypothetical system of care with the 
potential to disrupt the primary-care market: 
 
 40. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000). 
 41. PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED 
CARE ERA 11 (2002). 
 42. See id. at 60. 
 43. Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 
1998, at 80. 
 44. Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulation: In the Laboratory of the States, 278 JAMA 1102, 
1102 (1997). 
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Diabetes mellitus affects approximately eighteen million people in the 
United States, or about six percent of the population.45  Diabetes care is often 
suboptimal, despite simple diagnostic criteria and effective treatment options.  
Although treatment guidelines from the American Diabetes Association are 
readily available and widely accepted, less than five percent of patients with 
diabetes receive basic care that conforms to those guidelines.46  The clinical 
benefits of good glycemic control in patients with diabetes are well established.47  
Economic data suggest, moreover, that the cost of poor glycemic control may be 
substantial,48 far surpassing the additional resources required for closer 
monitoring, increased patient education, greater clinical or telephone contact, 
and higher drug costs.49  Despite these data, studies from a wide variety of 
practice settings confirm that glycemic control is suboptimal in most patients 
with diabetes.50 
While physician education51 and patient compliance52 may account for some 
of the problem, “system” factors likely drive the low figures.  Patients monitor 
their glucose, but there is no real-time interface with the physician to integrate 
the resulting data into treatment strategies.  The acute symptoms and concerns 
 
 45. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL DIABETES FACT SHEET: 
UNITED STATES 4 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/pdf/ndfs_2003.pdf. 
 46. See Gloria L. Beckles, et al., Population-Based Assessment of the Level of Care Among Adults 
with Diabetes in the U.S., 21 DIABETES CARE 1432 (1998). 
 47. See, e.g., The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group, The Effect of 
Intensive Treatment of Diabetes on the Development and Progression of Long-Term Complications in 
Insulin-Dependent Diabetes Mellitus, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 977 (1993) [hereinafter Intensive 
Treatment] (concluding that intensive therapy effectively delays the onset and slows the progression of 
diabetic retinopathy, nephropathy, and neuropathy in patients with insulin-dependent diabetes 
mellitus); American Diabetes Association, Standards of Medical Care for Patients with Diabetes 
Mellitus, 20 DIABETES CARE S5 (1997) [hereinafter Diabetes Standards] (summarizing the standards of 
care for patients with diabetes and the benefits associated with optimal glycemic control); Andrzej S. 
Krolewski et al., Glycosylated Hemoglobin and the Risk of Microalbuminuria in Patients with Insulin-
Dependent Diabetes Mellitus, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1251 (1995) (establishing that poor glycemic 
control abruptly increases the risk of microalbuminuria, the first manifestation of diabetic 
nephropathy); GianCarlo Viberti, Editorial, A Glycemic Threshhold for Diabetec Complications?, 332 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1293 (1995); U.K. Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) Group, Intensive Blood-
Glucose Control with Sulphonylureas or Insulin Compared with Conventional Treatment and Risk of 
Complications in Patients with Type 2 Diabetes (UKPDS 33), 352 LANCET 837 (1998) (concluding that 
intensive glycemic control reduces the incidence of microvascular complications). 
 48. See Todd P. Gilmer et al., The Cost to Health Plans of Poor Glycemic Control, 20 DIABETES 
CARE 1847 (1997). 
 49. See The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group, Resource Utilization and 
Costs of Care in the Diabetes Control and Complications Trial, 18 DIABETES CARE 1468, 1478 (1995). 
 50. See Jinan B. Saaddine, et al., Improvements in Diabetes Processes of Care and Intermediate 
Outcomes, 144 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 469 (2006) (showing, based on data from the Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System, that one in five patients with diabetes has poor glycemic control). 
 51. See Sean R. Tunis et al., Internists' Attitudes About Clinical Practice Guidelines, 120 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 956, 956 (1994) (concluding that many physicians were concerned about the 
guidelines’ possible effects on clinical autonomy, costs, and satisfaction with clinical practice). 
 52. See David G. Marrero et al., Nutrition Management of Type 2 Diabetes by Primary Care 
Physicians: Reported Uses and Barriers, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 818, 818 (2000) (detailing patient-
centered barriers to effective nutrition therapy). 
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that give rise to an office visit may crowd out the relatively less-urgent need to 
manage blood-glucose levels optimally.53 
Consider a hypothetical innovation for managing the care of patients with 
diabetes: a home glucose monitoring system that electronically transmits daily 
glucose levels to a database in the physician’s office.54  A companion software 
package automatically charts glucose levels over time.  Using evidence-based 
guidelines, the software flags alarming trends in glucose levels and generates 
printed reports that trigger intervention by a health care provider.  The specific 
intervention would depend upon the trend, and might range from an e-mail 
exchange to a telephone “check-up” to an office visit with the primary-care 
provider.  In the disruptive-innovation framework, the innovation provides a 
basic, integrated product (an enhanced blood-glucose monitoring system) to 
less-demanding consumers (outpatients with diabetes, rather than hospitalized 
or acutely ill patients) at a lower cost (regular information is transmitted 
between patients and physicians without the cost and inconvenience of an office 
visit). 
Initially, the basic product might appeal only to a small number of 
physicians and consumers.  Over time, technology vendors would likely enter 
the market to enhance the system in a variety of ways.  For example, an 
enhanced reporting module might be added to enable aggregation of data into 
cohorts defined by payer, employer, or disease severity.  In addition, the stand-
alone database might be linked to the office-based electronic medical record or 
scheduling system so that evidence-based practice guidelines, embedded in the 
system, could fuel reminders for primary-care teams.  As the infrastructure 
costs would likely be prohibitive for solo- or small-group practices, 
“cooperatives” might emerge to allow small physician groups to achieve 
economies of scale.  Alternatively, third-party vendors might bundle hardware, 
software, and technical support as a product for solo- and small-group practices.  
These approaches could lead to new ways of organizing providers around 
expensive capital equipment.  Again, in a disruptive-innovation framework, 
these and other enhancements would move the disruptive product along the 
performance trajectory and enable it to eventually capture a significant portion 
of the market. 
Perhaps surprisingly, under the current regulatory structure there are 
substantial disincentives to developing and adopting innovations like the one 
imagined above.  First, there is no reimbursement mechanism for investments in 
information infrastructure.  Although the basic innovation might be attractive 
for a subset of technology-savvy and technology-seeking physicians, continued 
implementation would likely depend on the widespread presence of an 
 
 53. Thomas Bodenheimer, Edward. H. Wagner & Kevin Grumbach, Improving Primary Care for 
Patients with Chronic Illness, 288 JAMA 1775, 1775 (2002). 
 54. Telemetric, home-based blood glucose monitoring devices have emerged in recent years, 
although they are not as automated as the hypothetical device we describe. See, e.g. , MetrikLink® at 
http://www.imetrikus.com/prod_ML.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2006). 
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infrastructure that supports an electronic medical record.  Under the current 
encounter-based reimbursement system, providers have little incentive to 
acquire technologies that enhance service but do not generate revenue.55  
Physicians are not able to bill for technology directly, or they are not able to 
share in the benefit of the service—improved efficiency and quality for patients 
reduces revenue for providers.  Second, the hypothetical innovation might 
increase demand for unbilled, informal communications between patients and 
care providers while decreasing the demand for acute office visits.  Again, the 
current system reimburses for office visits, not informal exchanges (for example, 
telephone conversations or e-mail exchanges).  Physicians who adopt the 
innovation would likely see their revenues decline. 
V 
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATION 
The regulatory framework that governs the U.S. health care system is 
flawed.  Complex and highly detailed regulations increase costs through 
paperwork, duplication of effort, and mandated inefficiency.  In addition, and 
perhaps more significantly, the regulatory framework escalates costs by stifling 
innovation in service delivery.  The example provided here is hypothetical, but 
it aptly describes the kind of quality-enhancing, lower-cost innovation that may 
never reach the market under the current regulatory structure. 
The current structure may be inhospitable to innovation because regulators 
do their jobs extremely well; that is, they develop regulations that address 
narrowly defined program goals.  The role of the regulator is analagous to the 
role of the manager in Christensen’s framework.56  Managers who listen 
carefully to consumers successfully push products along the performance 
trajectory through sustaining innovations.  In a competitive market, this 
practice creates a situation ripe for disruptive innovation.  Regulators fine-tune 
regulations and, similarly, force a product along a performance trajectory.  
Disruptive innovation cannot occur, however, because a new product is 
prohibited from entering below the threshold established by the regulation. 
What regulators do not do is evaluate how regulations affect overarching 
goals for quality and efficiency in the marketplace.  In addition, although 
forgone disruptive innovation is a substantial opportunity cost of regulation, 
regulatory bodies neither acknowledge the cost nor adjust for it in their 
analyses of the costs and benefits of new regulations.  Finally, the public 
rulemaking process closely attunes regulators to the interests of majority 
stakeholders, not to the interests of isolated innovators. 
 
 55. See Edward H. Shortliffe, Strategic Action in Health Information Technology: Why the Obvious 
Has Taken So Long, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1222, 1223–29 (2005) (describing financial and structural barriers 
to widespread adoption of information technology in health care). 
 56. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 15, at xiv–xxiv. 
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Making the regulatory environment more hospitable to innovation will not 
be a trivial task.  Disruptive innovations cannot be identified prospectively, so 
systematically collecting basic information on all innovations may help us to 
understand the circumstances that are most (or least) hospitable to disruptive 
innovation.  At a minimum, we should begin to catalog innovations as they 
arise.  In addition, the regulatory process should incorporate the opportunity 
costs of forgone disruptive innovation in the calculation of the costs of 
regulation.  While imprecise, this “thumb on the scale” would have the desired 
effect of reducing the net benefit of many proposed regulations.  Finally, and 
more fundamentally, a regulatory process that stifles innovation and increases 
costs calls into question the role of the government in a private health care 
system.  A careful examination of the regulatory process and its consequences 
may be in order. 
Disruptive innovation theory provides one lens through which to describe 
how regulations may stifle innovation and increase costs.  Can disruptive 
innovation deliver better quality and lower cost over time, and does the 
regulatory structure preclude achievement of these goals?  Empirical work is 
essential and might include reexamining the fundamental theory of regulation 
and its application to health care, quantifying the cost of regulation to the 
health care system, and using game theory to understand how well alternative 
regulatory structures might accommodate innovation.  To be clear, we do not 
propose deregulation of the health care market.  Regulations are necessary to 
assure basic protections, prevent fraud, maintain and promote access to care, 
and provide governing direction for large public programs.  Rather, we present 
one way of understanding how the current system of regulation often precludes 
cost-saving, quality-enhancing innovations from reaching the market.  To the 
extent that disruptive innovation cannot occur, health care will continue on a 
high-cost trajectory without commensurate gains in quality. 
